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A. Duty of Care
1. Malpractice
Burke v. Pearson' was a medical malpractice action based on
a heating pad burn. The plaintiff, while in the hospital, had used
the heating pad for four days before her injury was discovered.
The heating pad was a standard, low-temperature, hospital
model with printed instructions on the back stating that it should
not be used on sleeping or unconscious persons unless they were
carefully attended. During treatments with the heating pad the
plaintiff had been continuously unconscious or semiconscious due
to medication prescribed by her doctor. She therefore maintained
that the doctor breached his duty of care by not giving special
instructions to the nursing staff concerning the use of the pad.
The supreme court, reversing the lower court decision for the
plaintiff, held that she presented no evidence that the doctor had
reason to think the printed instructions on the heating pad would
not be followed. The court considered it reasonable for him to
expect proper use of the pad without any special instructions.
Justice Littlejohn dissented, maintaining that the directions
on the back of the heating pad were "general and for normal
use."2 He also considered the doctor's terse, written instruction
to the staff, "heating pad to back," insufficient to ensure that the
plaintiff would receive proper care. In his view, medical testi-
mony indicating that such instructions were customary skirted
the real issue-that the plaintiff, because of her insensibility, was
an extraordinary case to whom the doctor owed the duty to make
specific instructions.'
2. Occupied Crossing Doctrine
In Still v. Hampton & Branchville R.R.4 the plaintiff, while
driving at night, collided with the middle of a train at an un-
1. 259 S.C. 288, 191 S.E.2d 721 (1972).
2. Id. at 297, 191 S.E.2d at 726.
3. Id. at 298, 191 S.E.2d at 726.
4. 258 S.C. 416, 189 S.E.2d 15 (1972).
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guarded rural crossing. His action charged the railroad with negli-
gence in not adequately marking the crossing. There was conflict-
ing testimony about the location of the advance warning sign, but
the court found that the crossing was marked by conventional
crossbuck signs in compliance with the South Carolina Code.
The court treated the plaintiff's argument-that the railroad
owed a duty to warn motorists with lights, flagmen, or other
appropriate means because of the special hazard-as a recogni-
tion of the occupied crossing doctrine.6 Under this doctrine, in the
absence of an unusual hazard, a railroad has the right to occupy
a crossing for its legitimate purposes and need only furnish such
warning to travelers as may be required by statute. The doctrine
is accepted by most jurisdictions7 and has been applied pre-
viously in this state.8 Thus, because there was no evidence estab-
lishing the existence of an unusual hazard, there was no "extra"
duty placed upon the railroad.
The plaintiff had also brought suit against the South Caro-
lina Highway Department, alleging that the Department had lo-
cated the warning sign too near the crossing and had allowed it
to deteriorate. Section 33-232 of the South Carolina Code' re-
quires that a claimant plead and prove the absence of contribu-
tory negligence in order to recover from the Department. Because
the plaintiff had done neither, the supreme court concluded that
contributory negligence could be inferred and held that the De-
partment had been correctly granted a directed verdict.'"
3. Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
In Byrd v. Melton," an action for the wrongful death of an
infant drowned in a drainage ditch, the plaintiff based his claim
on the attractive nuisance doctrine. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina, concurring with the weight of authority, held that lia-
bility should be imposed on landowners for physical harm to tres-
passing children only when the injury has been caused by an
5. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-310, 58-999 (1962).
6. 258 S.C. at 426, 189 S.E.2d at 20.
7. See 65 Am. JuR. 2d Railroads § 490 (1972).
8. Poole v. Southern Ry., 250 S.C. 213, 157 S.E.2d 175 (1967).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-232 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
10. 258 S.C. at 428, 189 S.E.2d at 21.
11. 259 S.C. 271, 191 S.E.2d 515 (1972).
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artificial condition.' 2 In Byrd, "[t]he stream was a natural water
course forming a part of the natural drainage system of the City
of Columbia... ,"' which the defendant did not control, cre-
ate, or maintain." He was therefore not liable for the death of the
infant trespasser.
4. Automobile Guest Statute
The South Carolina guest statute establishes the following
standard of care:
No person transported by an owner or operator of a motor vehi-
cle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall
have a cause of action for damages against such motor vehicle
or its owner or operator for injury, death or loss in case of an
accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on
the part of such owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness
or his reckless disregard of the right of others.15
In Powell v. Simons,5 an action for the death of a passenger
resulting from a collision at an intersection where vandals had
replaced a stop sign with a "stop ahead" sign, the court routinely
held that a passenger cannot recover against a driver for simple
negligence. The duty owed to a passenger is to avoid injuring him
"willfully or by conduct in reckless disregard of his rights.' 1 7 In
explaining these terms the court said:
The test by which a tort is to be characterized as reckless, willful
or wanton is whether it has been committed in such a manner
and under such circumstances that a person of ordinary reason
or prudence would have been conscious of it as an invasion of
the rights of the deceased. 8
12. Id. at 276, 191 S.E.2d at 517; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 339 (1965);
62 Am. Jun. 2d Premises Liability § 148 (1972); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(82) (1966);
Fitch v. Selwyn Village, Inc., 234 N.C. 632, 68 S.E.2d 255 (1951).
13. 259 S.C. at 276, 191 S.E.2d at 517.
14. The court also relied on the fact that the city authorities had not found it feasible
to pipe and cover the stream. The cost of fencing was, in their opinion, prohibitive. Notice
of the condition in the form of neighbors' petitions was held to create no liability where
none existed under law. Id. at 275, 191 S.E.2d at 517.
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962).
16. 258 S.C. 242, 188 S.E.2d 386 (1972).
17. Id. at 246, 188 S.E.2d at 387.
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Player v. Thompson'9 was another case that hinged on
whether a driver's conduct was heedless or reckless. The court
summarized the facts as follows: Thompson permitted his es-
tranged wife to use his car for family purposes. The wife in turn
asked a friend to drive it to the store knowing that the friend did
not have a license. The plaintiff, who was a passenger in the car,
presented evidence that it was a rainy night, that the car's tires
were slick, and that the driver had been warned to slow down.
While the car was traveling at 25 m.p.h., a dog ran into the road
causing the driver to slam on the brakes, lose control, and slide
off the road.
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff, the supreme court held that the trial judge erred in deciding
as a matter of law that no evidence of recklessness had been
adduced. The question of recklessness in an action governed by
the guest statute is, of course, for the jury to decide unless "only
one reasonable inference . . . can be [drawn] from the evi-
dence."20
The possibility that the driver would be found reckless on
remand revived the potential related liability of Thompson and
his wife whom the plaintiff had sued for negligent entrustment
under the family purpose doctrine. Therefore, the court reversed
the trial judge's decision to grant nonsuits to those defendants.
B. Proximate Cause
In Fortner v. Carnes' the plaintiff brought an action to re-
cover from a garageman for the loss of his vehicle which had been
stolen and wrecked. He relied on the facts that the door of the
garage had not been well secured and that the ignition keys had
been left in the car on the night of the theft.
Carnes contended that his lack of due care was not the proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's loss. To support this position he
relied on the well settled rule stated in Stone v. Betheall and
Johnston v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. :23 When a third person's
willful, malicious, or criminal act intervenes between the defen-
19. 193 S.E.2d 531 (S.C. 1972).
20. Id. at 533, quoting In re Crawford, 205 S.C. 72, 92, 30 S.E.2d 841, 849 (1944).
21. 258 S.C. 455, 189 S.E.2d 24 (1972).
22. 251 8.C. 157, 161 S.E.2d 171 (1968).
23. 183 S.C. 126, 190 S.E. 459 (1937).
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dant's negligence and the occurrence of the injury, and the act
was neither intended by the defendant, nor could have been fore-
seen by him, the causal chain between the negligence and the
injury is broken.
The court, though acknowledging this general rule, distin-
guished Fortner as a bailment case in which the bailee had the
burden of showing due care.24 The court held that the theft itself
constituted the injury or loss to the bailor and that there was no
act of a third party intervening between the negligence of the
bailee and the resulting injury.
The issue of proximate cause was also raised in Player v.
Thompson,5 where a dog ran in front of the defendant's car caus-
ing her to lock the brakes and slide off the road injuring a passen-
ger. The defendant did not have a driver's license, the tires on her
car were slick, and a passenger had warned her to slow down
because of the wet road. The court framed the question in terms
of two concurring causes and reasoned: "In order to hold a defen-
dant liable, it is not necessary to prove that his or her recklessness
was the sole proximate cause of the injury. It is sufficient if it be
a concurring or a contributing proximate cause. 26 In making the
determination that something is a concurring cause, the court
employs a "but for" test.2' Thus, it held that it was not unreason-
able to conclude that the concurring action of the driver and the
dog proximately caused the injury.
C. Contributory Negligence
Two of the three contributory negligence cases decided dur-
ing the survey period involved a determination of how the reason-
able man as plaintiff would act. The other case demonstrated the
application of the rule that contributory negligence is not a bar
to recovery when the defendant's conduct is willful or wanton.
In Steele v. Lynches River Electric Cooperative, Inc.,23 the
24. The theory behind placing the burden on the bailee is that he is in a better
position to present evidence and that it would be unreasonable to make the bailor show
the lack of due care. 258 S.C. at 459-60, 189 S.E.2d at 26.
25. 193 S.E.2d 531 (S.C. 1972).
26. Id. at 533-34.
27. "It is enough to impose liability to show that it is a proximate concurring cause;
that is, one that was so efficient in causation that, but for it, the injury would not have
occured. . . ." 193 S.E.2d at 534, quoting Horton v. Greyhound Corp., 241 S.C. 430, 439,
128 S.E.2d 776, 781 (1962) (italics omitted).
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supreme court reversed the trial court's refusal to enter judgment
n.o.v. for the defendant because of the plaintiffs contributory
negligence. Although contributory negligence is usually a ques-
tion of fact for the jury, if there is but one reasonable inference
to be drawn from the evidence viewed in the light most favorable
to plaintiff, the question is one of law for judicial decision. 21 In
Steele the plaintiff received a 7200 volt shock when he climbed a
fence to cut an electric wire dangling from a transmission pole.
To support its ruling that this act was not negligent as a matter
of law, the trial court advanced the questionable premise that,
because the wire appeared to carry no more than customary
household current (120 volts), the plaintiff under normal circum-
stances "should not have anticipated that he would sustain such
injury as actually occurred."30 The plaintiff, however, had testi-
fied that he did not know what injury to expect.3 Consequently,
he could hardly have acted in reliance on normal circumstances.
The supreme court, noting that the plaintiff had completed
the tenth grade,held him to know that a wire charged with electri-
cal current is dangerous. Although the degree of danger from this
particular wire may not have been evident, the plaintiff's pur-
poseful action in touching the wire constituted contributory negli-
gence.
In Smoak v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R.12 the supreme court
reviewed an automobile passenger's obligation to avoid accidents.
The suit was brought for the wrongful death of a passenger in a
truck that collided with a train at a railroad crossing. Seaboard
asserted the defense of contributory negligence, contending that
the deceased had failed to warn the truck driver of the oncoming
train. In reviewing the evidence, the supreme court noted that,
although a driver should be told of hazards known to the passen-
ger, a passenger is not obligated to watch the road to perceive
dangers in the absence of peculiar circumstances.3 Because there
was no evidence that the passenger in this case should have been
more alert than the driver, who had braked the truck at least 177
feet before the collision, the inference drawn by the jury that the
29. E.g., Carroll v. Wilson, 255 S.C. 536, 180 S.E.2d 198 (1971).
30. Record at 156.
31. Id. at 60.
32. 193 S.E.2d 594 (S.C. 1972). See also Survey of Damages supra.
33. Id. at 596.
1973]
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passenger had not been negligent was clearly supported by the
record.
The auto accident involved in Bennett v. Peeler34 occurred at
the intersection of a four lane highway and a secondary road. The
east and westbound lanes of the highway were separated by a
grassy median traversed by the road at the intersection. Near the
intersection was a filling station where the defendant's beer truck
was parked. The plaintiff's intestate, Bennett, had been driving
west on the highway but crossed it at the intersection to enter the
station. When Bennett left the station and attempted to recross
the eastbound lanes to get back on the highway, his vision was
momentarily blocked by the beer truck. As Bennett was crossing
the inside eastbound lane, his car was hit by Peeler's and both
drivers were killed. The jury exonerated Peeler but held for the
plaintiff against the owner of the beer truck even though Ben-
nett's failure to yield the right of way to Peeler constituted negli-
gence per se.
The plaintiff averred that the driver of the beer truck had,
in violation of state law, 35 parked the truck partially on the trav-
elled portion of the road. As noted above, the defense of contribu-
tory negligence was based on Bennett's violation of a statute36 by
failing to yield the right of way to Peeler. Violation of a statute
is not only negligence per se but may also be evidence of willful-
ness or wantonness. 7 Because both the truck driver and Bennett
had violated statutes, the conduct of either or both could have
been considered willful and wanton by the jury. A majority of the
supreme court therefore held that the jury could reasonably reach
the dubious conclusion that the truck driver's violation consti-
tuted recklessness while that of the plaintiff only amounted to
negligence. Since simple contributory negligence is not a defense
to recklessness,38 the trial court did not have the authority to
grant the defendant judgment n. o. v.
D. Products Liability
Although products liability cases are often quite complex,
some of the clearest examples of negligent manufacture are the
34. 258 S.C. 545, 189 S.E.2d 814 (1972).
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-481 (1962).
36. Id. § 46-424.
37. Jumper v. Goodwin, 239 S.C. 508, 515, 123 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1962).
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"soft drink" cases. The plaintiff in Miller v. Atlantic Bottling
Corp.39 brought an action for damages after drinking a Mountain
Dew with a "deleterious" substance in it. Only two or three swal-
lows had been taken before a vile smell and taste were noticed,
and an unidentified substance was found in the bottle. The plain-
tiff testified that, though nauseated immediately, she did not go
to a doctor for two days. No chemical analysis of the substance
was presented, and the plaintiff's doctor did not testify. Thus, the
lower court granted a nonsuit to the defendant on the grounds
that no evidence was presented of a causal connection between
the substance and the plaintiff's illness.
The supreme court, while acknowledging that the plaintiff
had the burden of proving that the beverage was unwholesome
and that it caused the illness, held that the lower court erred in
granting the nonsuit. Testimony established that the plaintiff
was in good health before drinking the adulterated beverage but
became nauseated immediately afterwards. The bottle contain-
ing a foreign substance was also introduced into evidence. There-
fore the court, relying on Mitchell v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,4"
concluded that the plaintiff had carried his burden of proof:
When the results of an alleged act of negligence are such that
they are within the experience and observation of an ordinary
layman, a jury or court sitting as the trier of the facts can draw
a conclusion as to causal relationship without the necessity of
expert medical testimony.4
A poorly designed product can subject a manufacturer to
liability just as readily as a poorly made one. For example, the
case of Reamer Industries, Inc. v. McQuay, Inc.42 grew out of a
fire in the newly constructed Orangeburg-Calhoun TEC Center.
The general contractor made the necessary repairs and then
brought an action against the supplier and manufacturer of a fan
39. 259 S.C. 278, 191 S.E.2d 518 (1972).
40. 11 App. Div. 2d 579, 200 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1969).
41. 259 S.C. at 282, 191 S.E.2d at 519. The court distinguished Miller from Burr v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 256 S.C. 162, 181 S.E.2d 478 (1971), and Fowler v. Coastal Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 252 S.C. 579, 167 S.E.2d 572 (1969). In Burr the sequence of events was
thought to be too remote from the defendant's negligence, and in Fowler the plaintiff's
illness could reasonably have been attributed to an act for which the defendant was not
liable.
42. 344 F. Supp. 540 (D.S.C. 1971).
1973]
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 17
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss3/17
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
coil on theories of negligent design and construction and breach
of implied warranty.
In finding for the plaintiff on the question of negligent de-
sign, the federal district court restated well established South
Carolina law:
[A] manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the
manufacture of a chattel is liable to those whom he should ex-
pect to be endangered by its probable use or injuries caused by
lawful use of the chattel in the manner and for the purpose for
which it was supplied.4 3
Moreover, "[tihis principle applies without the necessity of priv-
ity between the manufacturer and the injured person."44
On the question of whether the negligent design was the
proximate cause of the damage, the court also held for the plain-
tiff but stated: "Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon it
is necessary that the evidence establish the reasonable likelihood
or probability of the occurrence and not merely the possibility of
the occurrence.
'45
While unwholesome foodstuffs and negligently designed
products comprise a sizable portion of the products liability
cases, the usual situation concerns a defective product such as in
Benford v. Berkeley Heating Co.4" This was an action against the
manufacturer and the installer of a furnace which caused a fire
that destroyed the plaintiff's home. The furnace vent had been
installed too close to a pine beam, and a blower switch failed to
operate properly thereby causing the temperature within the fur-
nace to become higher than normal. The lower court found for the
installer but against the manufacturer, and the manufacturer
appealed.
The supreme court reversed the lower court decision with
respect to the manufacturer's liability, holding that there was no
evidence that the defective switch could have caused the fire by
itself. In the court's view, the only reasonable inference from the
evidence was that the installer's intervening negligence was not
reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer. This decision was
based upon section 330 of the Restatement of Contracts:
43. Id. at 544, citing Salladin v. Telfis, 247 S.C. 267, 146 S.E.2d 875 (1966).
44. 344 F. Supp. at 544.
45. Id.
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In awarding damages, compensation is given for only those inju-
ries that the defendant had reason to foresee as a probable result
of his breach when the contract was made. If the injury is one
that follows the breach in the usual course of events, there is
sufficient reason for the defendant to foresee it.4"
Carolina Homebuilders, Inc. v. Armstrong Furnace Co. 8 is
an interesting case that can be read for the proposition that a
manufacturer49 has a duty of care in assuring an appropriate
choice of components. The plaintiff had purchased heating and
cooling equipment for his apartment building from the defen-
dant, and this action was for water damage caused by condensa-
tion from the cooling equipment spilling onto the floor rather
than into the drain pans. At trial the defendant admitted that the
problem resulted from the use of an evaporator that was not
compatible with the plaintiff's furnace system. The court stated
that the defendant was put on notice by the order for twenty-four
furnaces, condensers, and evaporators that these appliances
would be used in combination. Therefore, the jury could reasona-
bly conclude that the defendant was negligent in filling the order
without warning the plaintiff that the units did not match or
giving adequate instructions about their use.
I1. SLANDER
In Smith v. Phoenix Furniture Co.," two of the defendant's
employees mistook the plaintiff for his brother, called him a son-
of-a-bitch and a bastard, and erroneously accused him of trying
to "beat the furniture company out of money" owed to it.5' The
plaintiff took umbrage and promptly brought an action for slan-
der.
The federal district court, in granting the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, first noted that the abusive language was
not actionable per se. It stated the South Carolina rule as follows:
47. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 330, at 509 (1932). It should be noted that the
plaintiff presented evidence supporting both implied warranty and negligence theories
and, when compelled to elect, chose the former.
48. 259 S.C. 346, 191 S.E.2d 774 (1972) (reversed and remanded on grounds of preju-
dicial error in instructions).
49. The distributor of the equipment, Sun Heating Co., was dismissed from the
action at the plaintiff's election. Id. at 354, 191 S.E.2d at 777.
50. 339 F. Supp. 969 (D.S.C. 1972).
51. Id. at 970.
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[Words are actionable [which] falsely or maliciously charge
the commission of a crime, or which distinctly assume or imply
one has committed a crime, or which raise a strong suspicion in
the minds of hearers or readers that one has committed a crime,
or which plainly and falsely charge the contraction of a conta-
gious disease, adultery or want of chastity, or unfitness in the
way of a professional trade. 2
Because the words used by the defendant's employees did not fall
within any of the categories above, in order to recover the plaintiff
had to prove special damage; that is, actual damage "capable of
being assessed at monetary value."53 This was an insurmountable
obstacle, for there was no evidence that the plaintiff had sus-
tained any damage at all. The vulgar language amounted only to
words spoken in anger: "It [did] not appear that anyone who
heard the words . . understood them in a defamatory sense."5
Moreover, the plaintiff did not establish by way of colloquium
that the epithets were directed at him, because the defendant's
employees had mistaken him for his brother and had reviled only
the latter.5
III. FRAUD
A common example of fraud occurs when a party to a trans-
action conceals a material fact that he has a duty to disclose.
This was the situation in Lawson v. Citizens & Southern National
Bank. 7 The plaintiffs built a house on lots purchased from the
defendant. Several years later, during repairs to stop the house
from sinking, they discovered that the lots had been filled with
construction debris and capped with clay. The defendant main-
tained that the plaintiffs knew of the gully on the property before
they purchased it. The plaintiffs, however, contended that
though they were aware of a small gully in the front of the
property they purposely built their house on a different spot and
had no knowledge that the lots had been filled.
62. Id. at 971, citing Matthews v. United States Rubber Co., 219 F. Supp. 831
(D.S.C.), aff'd, 332 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963); Lesesne v. Willingham, 83 F. Supp. 918
(D.S.C. 1949).
53. 339 F. Supp. at 971, citing Sandifer v. Electrolux Corp., 172 F.2d 548 (4th Cir.
1949). See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 760-62 (4th ed. 1971).
54. 339 F. Supp. at 972.
55. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 111, at 749 (4th ed. 1971).
56. See, e.g., Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 201 S.C. 427, 23 S.E.2d 372 (1942).
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The court resolved this conflict and disposed of the case by
accepting the plaintiff's evidence as true because the defendant
was appealing the trial court's refusal to grant it judgment n. o. v.
Concluding that the defendant's liability was clear, the court
perfunctorily restated the law applicable to cases of this type:
"Where material facts are accessible to the vendor only, and he
knows them not to be within the reach of the diligent attention,
observation and judgment of the purchaser, the vendor is bound
to disclose such facts and make them known to the purchaser."59
WILLARD R. NICHOLS
58. Id. at 126.
59. Id. at 128.
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